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An Improved Analytical Framework for the Official Acknowledgment Doctrine
I. INTRODUCTION

Maintaining transparency in governmental institutions is an integral component
of a successful democracy.1 To achieve transparency, citizens need information about
elected officials, agency activities, societal issues, and ideas that may stimulate
personal intellectual development.2 This information is necessary in order to enlighten
the citizenry, and promote justice and liberty through public participation in the
political process.3
	Safety and order are equally important to the success of democratic institutions.4
While safety and order do not immediately conflict with transparency, tensions may
arise when governing officials withhold information from the public for the stated
purpose of protecting national security.5 This Note will assess the tension between
national security and the public’s right to access information. It will argue that, in at
least one area of jurisprudence, the balance is tipped in the wrong direction—toward
censorship—which, among other things, impedes transparency. This area of
jurisprudence concerns situations in which an individual seeks to compel a government
agency to formally disclose information that the agency would otherwise withhold
from the public, even though the information is already available in the public
domain.6 When these situations are litigated, courts rely upon what is known as the
“official acknowledgment doctrine” to determine whether to compel the government
to produce the information at issue.7 In general, the official acknowledgment doctrine
1.

See generally Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 224–63 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
Library of Am. 2004) (1835).

2.

Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution 16 (Alfred A.
Knopf 2005) (explaining that people and their representatives need to have the capacity to exercise their
democratic responsibilities, which requires access to information and education in order to participate
and govern effectively). Political Philosopher Benjamin Constant described liberty to include the
citizens’ right to examine the actions or accounts of those who administer government to hold them
responsible for their misdeeds. Id. at 4.

3.

Id. at 3. Liberty means the ability and freedom to participate in the government itself. As expressed by
the founding fathers of the United States, there must be freedom of the individual citizen to participate
in the government and share with others the right to make and control the nation’s public acts. Id.

4.

See De Tocqueville, supra note 1, at 208.

5.

See Larry Berman & Bruce Allen Murphy, Approaching Democracy 19 (1996).

6.

Disclosure of information is sought for various reasons, but one example where an individual may seek
disclosure of information that is already available in the public domain is when that individual needs the
information to be officially acknowledged in order to publish the information without legal consequence.
This example is demonstrated in Wilson v. McConnell, 501 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), discussed
infra notes 116–29 and accompanying text.

7.

The official acknowledgment doctrine is used to free information from government censorship because
the government is not entitled to censor information that it has already officially acknowledged. James
T. O’Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure §9:50 (3d ed. 2008). To establish that information is
officially acknowledged, thus warranting disclosure, a plaintiff must prove three elements. Plaintiffs
must demonstrate that the information requested: (1) is “as specific” as the information previously
released; (2) “matches” the information previously disclosed; and (3) was previously made public
“through an official and documented disclosure.” Id. This Note will focus solely on the third element of
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is a common law doctrine intended to facilitate formal disclosure of information that
would otherwise be censored by the government if the information had not already
been publicly disclosed through some informal means.8
Part II of this Note will trace how government officials throughout American
history used informal means to disclose information, such as “leaks,” as a systematic
and deliberate method of communicating sensitive information to the public.
Additionally, Part II will argue that using leaks to disclose information to the public
has become an accepted tool in governing. The framework created in Part II supports
the proposition that disseminating information through informal means of
communication has been, and currently is, a crucial means by which the American
public receives necessary information about government activities.
Part III of this Note will demonstrate that courts are interpreting one element of
the official acknowledgment doctrine—the requirement that the information
requested be previously made public “through an official and documented
disclosure”—in an unduly narrow manner. Lastly, Part IV will argue that courts
should look to the fair report privilege for a broader interpretation of an “official”
disclosure. If courts apply a broader interpretation, the public will be provided with
the necessary information to enable government institutions to become more
transparent.9
II.	THE PERVASIVE AND SYSTEMATIC USE OF INFORMAL METHODS OF
COMMUNICATION IN UNITED STATES HISTORY

	Access to information about government activities is vital to the health of a
democratic society.10 While modern communication technology, such as the Internet,
has allowed for public access to official information about government activities on a
scale unparalleled in history, the “leak” remains the source of unofficial, but equally
important, information about government activities. These “unofficial” or “informal”
this doctrine, namely that the information requested “was previously made public through an official
and documented disclosure.” Id.
8.

See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 420 (2d Cir. 1989). The
doctrine may be invoked in two realms: in Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) cases it operates as a
waiver to the government’s right to withhold information, and in First Amendment cases it serves to
negate or override the government’s interest in restricting the dissemination of information already
known by person(s) seeking to disseminate that information. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1139
(D.C. Cir. 1983). Most often the government argues that information requested pursuant to FOIA
should not be disclosed because it will endanger national security. National security jurisprudence
demonstrates the judiciary’s willingness to accept this argument, and exemplifies the judiciary’s great
deference to the executive branch. Id. at 1143.

9.

See Berman & Murphy, supra note 5, at 19 (asserting that citizens must have access to information and
an open exchange of information).

10.

See Kristine A. Oswald, Mass Media and the Transformation of American Politics, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 385,
392 (1994) (“[A] ‘marketplace of ideas’ . . . theory asserts that truth can be discovered only through a
process of conf licting views and public debate. Therefore, free expression is justified because of its
benefit to society.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies
1209 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2006).
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leaks provide the public with information to which it has a right to know, regardless
of whether the leaks are authorized by government officials.11 This section
demonstrates the importance of leaks in American history as a means of revealing
important information about the government to the public.12 Information, irrespective
of the form in which it is disclosed, increases transparency in governance and provides
the electorate with the essential information it needs to monitor and evaluate
government officials.13
A. The Birth of Informal Disclosures in American Political History

	A “leak” can be an unauthorized or deliberate disclosure of secret or confidential
information.14 Leaks have long played an integral role in American politics. Most
often, public officials use leaks to advance personal or political agendas, or to thwart
the goals of political opponents. Leaks have also served as catalysts for numerous
high-profile investigations with lasting repercussions throughout American
history.15
The earliest leaks and leak investigations in American history commenced with
partisan maneuvering in Congress, when an already leak-prone Senate discovered
that these disclosures provided the ability to communicate with constituents in the
senators’ home districts.16 The first significant leak can be traced back to 1795. Amid
fierce partisan struggles between Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans, senators
violated orders mandating members to secrecy by giving a journalist information
about the first treaty after the adoption of the Constitution.17 Five years later, in
1780, a newspaper published a story regarding a politically sensitive bill based on
information divulged from secret Senate sessions.18 The frequent, unauthorized
11.

See ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security, The Media and Government
Leaks 4 (Patricia Garvin Cathcart & Deborah Fletcher, eds. 1984).

12.

See Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists’ Confidentiality,
43 San Diego L. Rev. 425 (2006).

13.

Berman & Murphy, supra note 5, at 18–19.

14.

The American Heritage College Dictionary 772 (3d ed. 2000). A leak is also defined as the
“disclosure of secret, [especially] official, information, as to the news media, by an unnamed source.”
Dictionary.com, Leak, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/leak (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).

15.

See Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 426 (discussing the impact of informal disclosures in American
history). Kielbowicz states that “[l]eaks have considerable utility in launching and advancing policies as
well as crippling them, in enhancing the political status of the leaker and the leak’s patron on
undercutting enemies, and in cultivating favorable relations with reporters for long-term gain. Of
course, a single leak can serve multiple purposes.” Id. at 432.

16.

Id. at 443. The leaks that involved Congress in the nineteenth century served at least four purposes.
They armed minority factions with the power of publicity, gave lawmakers leverage in battles with the
White House, exposed congressional corruption, and prompted investigations of executive departments.
Id. at 432.

17.

Id. at 433.

18.

Id. at 434. This bill proposed to revise the procedure for deciding the outcome of close presidential
races. Id.
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disclosures concerning the Senate’s secret review of treaties led to three incidents
between 1844 and 1848 in which newspapers published entire documents from secret
proceedings rather than merely reporting on the events that took place.19 These
incidents culminated with the New York Herald publishing a “Statistical Table of
the Leaks of the United States Senate,” which highlighted the flagrant hypocrisy of
the senators’ actions and how leaks had become a common tool of political
communication.20
	In 1905, the first agency press office was established. 21 Since that time,
government officials have used the media to leak information as part of covert
publicity strategies.22 The government uses the media because the media is a central
mouthpiece for disseminating information to the general public. 23 This process,
however, leads to an inherent tension; the media often serves the dual function of
being both a mouthpiece to disseminate official government information, and a
watchdog to protect the public interest by investigating illegal, scandalous, or other
government misconduct.24 The media’s intimate relationship with the government
and the media’s role in disseminating official information naturally runs counter to
the view that the media is supposed to function as a check on government and expose
official injustice.25 It is for this latter view that the media is often thought of as the
fourth branch of government.26
While leaks can and have been used for political maneuvering or to covertly
promote or undermine potential policy initiatives, leaks have virtue where traditional
19.

Id. at 436. Most notable of which was the New York Herald’s publication of the still secret 1848 treaty
that ended the war with Mexico. Id.

20. Id. The table’s first column listed newspapers in five leading cities, the second named the correspondent

for each, and the third identified senators who favored each reporter with confidential information. Id.
at 436–37.

21.

Jodie Morse, Managing the News: The History and Constitutionality of the Government Spin Machine, 81
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 843, 845 (2006) (discussing elected officials, primarily the United States President, and
his administration’s use of the media).

22.

Id.

23.

See Berman & Murphy, supra note 5, at 442–43, 452; Oswald, supra note 10, at 401 (“Journalists
inf luence government policy-making in the following ways: (1) by creating the reality in which
government leaders act, (2) by playing the role of public opinion representatives, (3) by giving attention
to particular issues, and (4) by acting as a link between governmental bureaucracies.”).

24.

See Berman & Murphy, supra note 5, at 451–52 (“Social scientists are in general agreement that the
mass media perform three basic functions: (1) surveillance of world events, (2) interpretation of events,
and (3) socialization of individuals into cultural settings.”); Oswald, supra note 10, at 389–91 (comparing
the media to a fourth branch of government because it acts as a check on the other three branches).

25.

Oswald, supra note 10, at 389. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black remarked that “the Government’s
power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the
Government.” Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring)). “Former US Senator Robert Kasten said that the free flow of information ensures that our
citizens are fully informed about the issues of the day . . . and it ensures that misrepresentation can be
uncovered in the give and take of full and robust debate.” Id.

26. See Douglass Cater, The Fourth Branch of Government (1959).
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methods of communicating official information fall short. 27 Government officials
may employ leaks to gauge public acceptance of particular policy options (to help
formulate more popular policies), or to slowly introduce novel ideas to a skeptical
public and thus indirectly sway congressional opinion. 28 Leaks can also be said to
improve government efficiency by enabling the government to issue statements
outside the rigid bureaucratic framework in which it is forced to operate. 29 In this
way, leaks can signal a government’s intentions without committing the government
to any particular proposal, provide insight on informal government negotiations to
both the public and other interested governments who may not be privy to the
discussion, substitute for formal negotiations when parties are deadlocked or
prevented from meeting formally, and carry messages between governments that do
not have formal diplomatic relations.30 As further discussed below, the important
functions leaks serve are also highlighted during times of war and threatened
international conflict, when a government is apprehensive to issue formal directives
for fear of triggering catastrophic consequences.31
B. Leaks Become a Fixture in American Politics

While the legislative branch was the first to use leaks, the executive branch,
including U.S. presidents and appointed individuals in the administration, quickly
followed suit by skillfully using unauthorized disclosures to advance political
agendas.32 President Theodore Roosevelt was known for using “trial balloons” to test
public reaction to policy options.33 If public response to the leaked “balloon” was
positive, Roosevelt would proceed with the initiative. If feedback was negative,
Roosevelt would deny the veracity of the report, which would typically be based on
unnamed sources.34 President Roosevelt also used leaks to alienate political allies so
that he would not be held responsible for the negative information released. 35 The
use of leaks in both national and international spheres was also apparent during the
administration of President Woodrow Wilson. 36 Use of leaks in the international
27.

Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 469–70. In addition to its “role in political maneuvering and policymaking,
leaks facilitate governance by supplementing the formal channels of organizational and interorganizational communication.” Id. at 476. Furthermore, “most scholars, along with journalists, regard
leaks as primarily a form of news management by sources for political gain.” Id. at 468.

28. Id. at 469–70.
29. Id. at 482.
30. Id.
31.

Id.

32.

Id. at 444–46.

33.

Id. at 444.

34. Id.
35.

Id. at 482.

36. Id. at 445.
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arena was particularly helpful to President Franklin Roosevelt because his administration
coincided with the explosive growth of the federal government during the New Deal
era and World War II. President Roosevelt used leaks to inform and persuade public
opinion about complex issues and sensitive public affairs. 37 Leaks were an active
component of Roosevelt’s well-orchestrated, multi-channel communication campaigns.38
Leaks pervaded foreign relations long after FDR, as illustrated by the Kennedy
administration’s negotiations with the Soviet Union during the Cuban Missile Crisis.39
President Kennedy supplemented direct formal contacts with Moscow with indirect
leaks to the press in order to prevent discussions that could trigger nuclear exchange.40
Immediately after Kennedy’s use of leaks, President Lyndon Johnson directed an aide
to secretly disclose a story to the press concerning the administration’s plans to cut
support for domestic rice growers even though no such plans were in place. President
Johnson used this fictitious plan as a negotiating tactic to gain the support of rice
growers and lawmakers on a different proposal.41
The Watergate scandal during the Nixon administration was blown wide open
by probably the most prominent series of leaks in American history. Watergate also
marked a pivotal turning point in the way leaks were generated; it marked the point
when exposing governmental activities became a more central aspect in the media’s
investigative reporting. Due to a government official’s unauthorized disclosure to the
Washington Post, the public learned of the Nixon administration’s criminal behavior.42
The government official behind these unauthorized disclosures, long known only as
“Deep Throat,”43 was recently revealed to be Mark Felt, a high-ranking FBI
37.

Id. at 446. According to historian Bruce Catton, leaks were “essential to the operation of the democracy
in these complex times.” Furthermore:
[I]t is through the leak that the people are kept in touch with their government . . . . It
is the leak which enables them to know whether the fine boasts and pretensions of an
appointed person are really justified. It is the leak—telling them what may happen,
what is being planned, what the carefully hidden facts actually are, which makes it
possible for them to react while there is still time and thus exert an influence on the
handling of affairs. Although leaking was frequently misused by self-seekers and
schemers and often made officials look inefficient, our particular form of government
wouldn’t work without it.

Id. (quoting Bruce Catton, The War Lords of Washington 87–89 (1948)).
38. Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 446.
39.

Id. at 482–83.

40. Id.
41.

Id. at 471.

42.

Id. at 479–80; Samuel Dash, Morality in American Politics: Is It Possible?, 39 Brandeis L.J. 773, 774
(2001).

43.

Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 428. Deep Throat was the secret source who provided information to the
Washington Post in connection with the Watergate scandal. The source remained anonymous for more
than thirty years until it was revealed to be W. Mark Felt in an article published in Vanity Fair. John D.
O’Connor, The Deep Throat Revelation: “I’m The Guy They Called Deep Throat,” Vanity Fair, July 2005,
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2005/07/deepthroat200507.
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official during the 1970s. Deep Throat’s leaks helped the Washington Post uncover
enough evidence of executive wrongdoing to spark a congressional investigation that
revealed the president’s role in criminal behavior, including burglary, illegal
wiretapping, perjury, suborning of perjury, and conspiracy.44 As a result of the
disclosures to the Washington Post, an investigation ensued that enabled action to be
taken to end the criminal behavior, prevent any further negative repercussions, and
restore a sense of constitutional democracy and legitimacy to the U.S. government.45
Official and unofficial leaks were also frequent during the Reagan administration,46
as were the scandals they helped uncover. In 1983, the State Department established
the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean for the
ostensible purpose of educating the public about the Reagan administration’s policies
concerning the Nicaraguan conflict.47 The Office, however, also engaged in covert
operations known as “white propaganda,” in which the Office awarded contracts to
journalists and academics who would secretly prepare op-ed columns on behalf of
the government that criticized the Nicaraguan government’s weapons programs.48
These disclosures were so intertwined with the Reagan administration that Alexander
Haig, Secretary of State during the Reagan administration, noted that despite the
problems caused by some leaks, “in the end I concluded that they were a way of
governing. Leaks constituted policy; they were the authentic voice of the
government.”49

44. Dash, supra note 42, at 774.
45.

See generally id.

46. See William E. Lee, Left out in the Cold? The Chilling of Speech, Association, and the Press in Post-9/11

America, 57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1453, 1468 (2008). Max Frankel, a New York Times reporter, submitted an
affidavit in connection with the Pentagon Papers litigation recounting the numerous occasions during
the 1960s when presidents and cabinet officials provided him with secret information. Frankel’s affidavit
stated:
	I know how strange all this must sound. We have been taught, particularly in the past
generation of spy scares and Cold War, to think of secrets as secrets—varying in their
“sensitivity” but uniformly essential to the private conduct of diplomatic and military
affairs and somehow detrimental to the national interest if prematurely disclosed. By
the standards of official Washington—government and press alike—this is an
antiquated, quaint and romantic view. For practically everything that our Government
does, plans, thinks, hears and contemplates in the realms of foreign policy is treated as
secret—and then unravelled by that same Government, by Congress and by the press in
one continuing round of professional and social contacts and cooperative and competitive
exchanges of information.

Id. at 1468–70 (citation omitted).
47.

Morse, supra note 21, at 854.

48. Id. Even though the Office was created by the State Department, the “white propaganda” initiatives

remained a secret from the State Department press office. Id.

49. Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 472 (quoting Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan,

and Foreign Policy 17 (1984)).
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C. Examples of Informal Disclosures in Contemporary American Politics

The enduring importance of leaks and their prevalence in American society is
exemplified by a string of recent leaks that began in 2004.50 Information concerning
these events is still being exposed today.51 In January of 2004, a military investigator
received an anonymous letter and photographs documenting pervasive abuse
occurring at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.52 The public outcry in response to this
divulgence spurred heightened attention to the government’s actions in pursuing the
war in Iraq, and in the area of national security.53
	In 2005, journalist Robert Novak reported that Valerie Wilson Plame was a
covert Central Intelligence Agency operative.54 Subsequent investigation suggested
that this information was leaked by the Bush administration in retaliation for an
op-ed piece that Plame’s husband, Ambassador Joseph Wilson, published in the New
York Times.55 The article reported that the White House had twisted intelligence
about Iraq’s nuclear weapons program—a claim featured in President Bush’s State of
the Union address to justify the 2003 Iraq invasion.56 The source of the leak was later
identified as the Vice President’s Chief of Staff Lewis “Scooter” Libby.57
	Also in 2005, the New York Times revealed that the National Security Agency
(NSA) had been monitoring the domestic telecommunications of American citizens
without warrants since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.58 Further
disclosure uncovered President Bush’s involvement and secret approval of domestic
wiretapping.59 In addition, a 2005 Washington Post story reported on the secret
overseas U.S. prisons for terrorists run by the Central Intelligence Agency, where it
50. See Lee, supra note 46, at 1464. Leaking classified information to the public is so pervasive in current

politics “that it is often described as a routine method of communication about government.” Id. at
1467.

51.

See id.

52.

Laura Barandes, A Helping Hand: Addressing New Implications of the Espionage Act on Freedom of the Press,
29 Cardozo L. Rev. 371, 376 (2007) (“The information was leaked to CBS News, which delayed
airing the photographs at the behest of the government until April 29, 2004.”).

53.

Id.

54. Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 464.
55.

See id. It should be noted that the Bush administration contended that President Bush was exercising his
authority to declassify documents as explanation for the disclosure of certain information. Democrats,
however, asserted that “the selective disclosure was for partisan political reasons and labeled the
President ‘the leaker in chief.”’ Lee, supra note 46, at 1458.

56. Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 464. In President Bush’s State of the Union address, which occurred on

January 28, 2003, President Bush stated that “[t]he British government has learned that Saddam Hussein
recently sought significant qualities of uranium from Africa.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller,
397 F.3d 965, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

57.

Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 465.

58. Ames Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2005,

at A1, available at http:www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html.

59.

Barandes, supra note 52, at 377.
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was alleged that torture was rampant.60 Again, further development of the story
linked President Bush to the secret prisons and, to the surprise of those inside and
outside the White House, prompted the official acknowledgement of the existence of
the prisons by President Bush himself.61 The integral role that informal disclosures
serve in disseminating information to the public, and as a tool for governing, is
apparent. Without these leaks, and the opportunities they create to expose and
remedy government wrongdoing, American democratic institutions at home and
U.S. prominence abroad would suffer.
III.	THE UNDULY NARROW INTERPRETATION OF “THROUGH AN OFFICIAL AND
DOCUMENTED DISCLOSURE”

The “official acknowledgment” doctrine is a common law doctrine wrought from
an amalgamation of cases pertaining to situations in which plaintiffs argue that
certain information, which the government seeks to censor, must be officially
acknowledged because the information is available in the public domain.62 Specifically,
the doctrine is used to assess whether information that is available in the public
domain, but which has not been categorized as officially acknowledged by the
government, should be identified as “officially disclosed” by a court.63 Pursuant to
this doctrine, information that would otherwise be withheld from the public is
disclosed because the government is prohibited from censoring information that it
has already officially acknowledged.64 In order for the disclosure to be deemed
“official,” it must have resulted from a disclosure made by the agency responsible for
protecting the specific information at issue.65 From a policy standpoint, the interest
60. Kielbowicz, supra note 12, at 427.
61.

Barandes, supra note 52, at 376.

62. See generally Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1989). The

doctrine operates both within First Amendment matters and FOIA claims. While the same requirements
must be met regardless of this distinction, courts have recognized the diverging burdens and interests of
each claim. This distinction was identified in McGehee v. Casey, another case concerning a former CIA
officer who sought disclosure of information to publish in a manuscript. 718 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir.
1983). The McGehee court explicitly noted the distinction when it stated, “in a FOIA case, an individual
seeks to compel release of documents in the government’s possession. Here, by contrast, [the plaintiff]
wishes publicly to disclose information that he already possesses, and that the government has ruled
that his secrecy agreement forbids disclosure.” Id. at 1147. The court raised another significant factor
establishing that the “difference between seeking to obtain information and seeking to disclose
information already obtained raises [the plaintiff ’s] constitutional interests in [the] case above the
constitutional interests held by FOIA claimant[s].” Id. Furthermore, the McGehee court established
another crucial distinction. In contrast to FOIA cases, in First Amendment cases both parties know the
information in question. When this is the situation, it is recommended that courts would benefit from
critique and illumination by the party claiming that the information should not be disclosed. Id. at
1149.

63. Hudson River Sloop, 891 F.2d at 421.
64. O’Reilly, supra note 7.
65.

Id.
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in preventing further dissemination of identical information is outweighed by an
individual’s competing First Amendment rights.66
To establish that information has been “officially acknowledged,” a plaintiff must
prove three elements.67 The information requested must (1) be “as specific” as the
information previously released; (2) “match” the information previously disclosed;
and (3) have already been made public “through an official and documented
disclosure.”68 The third element, “through an official and documented disclosure,”
will be the focus of this analysis because it is one of the elements on which courts
have based decisions to support withholding information.69 Specifically, this section
will address how courts interpret and apply the third element of the official
acknowledgment doctrine in an unduly narrow manner, resulting in unwarranted
censorship.
A.	Creation of the Official Acknowledgment Doctrine and the Narrow Interpretation
Employed by Courts

The following cases exemplify the courts’ narrow interpretation of the third
element of the official acknowledgement doctrine, and demonstrate the courts’
refusal to find that officially acknowledged information warranting disclosure has
been disclosed through an official and documented disclosure. The official
acknowledgement doctrine first appeared in Hudson River Sloop v. Dep’t of Navy. In
that case, the Navy announced its preferred site for the homeport of an American
battleship and its accompanying six-ship, surface-action group. Several of the ships
in the group were capable of carrying nuclear weapons.70 There was serious public
concern regarding the risks of U.S. Navy warships carrying nuclear weapons because
the homeport was to be located in New York City’s harbor.71 Even though the Navy
issued a Final Environmental Impact Statement, the plaintiffs brought suit asserting
that the Navy failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act public
disclosure requirement by failing to discuss the environmental impact of stationing
nuclear weapons at the homeport.72 Plaintiffs sought disclosure of this environmental
impact information. The Navy, however, argued that the information was exempt
from disclosure on national security grounds.73 Plaintiffs contended that the
66. Id. (“The First Amendment precludes censorship of official disclosed information.”).
67.

Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Wilson v. McConnell, 501 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussed infra notes 116–29 and

accompanying text). Courts render decisions that prevent disclosure of information pursuant to other elements
of the official acknowledgement doctrine, but the third element appears to be the most problematic in light
of the government’s use of leak-style disclosures when governing, as demonstrated supra in Part II.

70. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1989).
71.

Id.

72. Id. at 416–17.
73. Id. at 417, 421.

313

An Improved Analytical Framework for the Official Acknowledgment Doctrine

information had already been disclosed in an affidavit of a retired navy admiral.74
The court, relying on a series of prior cases, stated that:
These cases hold that the recited exemptions may not be invoked to prevent
public disclosure when the government has officially disclosed the specific
information being sought. Plaintiff bears the burden of showing specific
information in the public domain that duplicated the information withheld . . . .
plaintiff must show that information in the public domain is as specific as
that which is being sought, relates to the same time period, and has been the
result of an official disclosure.75

The court, however, found that the disclosure in the affidavit was not sufficient
because the admiral’s statements could not be an official disclosure since the admiral
was no longer an active naval officer.76 The court inferred that “officials no longer
serving with an executive branch department cannot continue to disclose official
agency policy through speculation, no matter how reasonable it may appear to be.” 77
Therefore, even though the court recognized the official acknowledgment doctrine,
it imposed an unduly narrow interpretation on the third element of the doctrine,
ignoring the fact that the former official’s statements were credible not because of
who he was, but because of where he had disclosed them—in a sworn affidavit.78
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the information sought was
disclosed through an official and documented disclosure even though this information
was included within an affidavit from an experienced and high-ranking Navy
officer.79 This reasoning, and subsequent narrow interpretations, gives enhanced and
unfounded protections to the government. The court approved the government
censorship on what can be viewed as a mere technicality: the employment status of a
military official. It capitalized on the admiral being retired, rather than focusing on
the fact that this information gained credibility because the admiral disclosed the
information in an accredited document—an affidavit. The court even conceded that
the officer’s statements “perhaps deserve credit beyond that afforded,” but concluded
that irrespective of how credible the officer’s insights were, his disclosures “did not
translate into official disclosures.”80 This reasoning is easily subject to manipulation.
Furthermore, government employees are inherently more willing to disclose truthful
information subsequent to their employment because they no longer face the fear of
being fired.81 Information revealed by these individuals may provide crucial insight
74.

Id. at 421.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77.

Id. at 422.

78. Id. at 421–22.
79. Id. at 421.
80. Id. at 421–22.
81.

Employees of intelligence agencies, such as the CIA and NSA, are not provided protection under the
Whistleblower Protection Act. If an employee discloses classified information to an unauthorized
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into activities that the public has a right to know about. Importantly, this type of
disclosure is strikingly similar to the way in which information was leaked by
government officials throughout history as discussed in Part II, which bolsters the
argument that the court in Hudson River Sloop erred in finding that the information
did not satisfy the third element of the official acknowledgement doctrine.82
Afshar v. Dep’t of State and Military Audit Project v. Casey are additional
demonstrations of the courts’ narrow interpretation of the official acknowledgment
doctrine, and their refusal to recognize that information was sufficiently disclosed
through an official and documented disclosure.83 Furthermore, these cases underscore
the inherent problems in interpreting the third element too narrowly.84 In Afshar, the
plaintiff sought information under FOIA pertaining to the defendant and his
activities.85 The plaintiff pointed to three public documents to support his position: a
1974 CIA dispatch from its headquarters to a CIA office, a cable and memorandum
generated by the State Department, and a number of books written by former CIA
agents and officials that were cleared by the agency’s prepublication review
department. 86 Central to the plaintiff ’s argument was that the release of the
information requested could not result in damage to national security or disclose
unknown intelligence sources or methods because the information was already
available to the public.87 In regard to the books written by former CIA agents and
officials that were pre-approved by the CIA for publication, the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ arguments that the CIA’s screening and approval of the books rendered
them official and made the disclosure “tantamount to official executive
acknowledgments, rather than unauthorized comments by former government
officials.”88 In furtherance of its narrow interpretation, the court reasoned that such
books are not generally treated as official disclosures by foreign governments or by
the public in the same way that a CIA cable would be, and furthermore, most of the
books did not mention that the CIA had cleared them.89
This conclusory analysis contradicts established principles that require disclosure
of such information, which the court itself referenced. Specifically, in its analysis the
individual, they may be removed from any position of trust, have their security clearances revoked, be
terminated, and in some instances face criminal prosecution. Lee, supra note 46, at 1466 (referencing 5
U.S.C. § 2303(a)(ii) (2006)).
82. See supra Part II.
83. Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1125; Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
84. Military Audit Project, 656 F.2d at 724; Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130–35.
85. Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1128. Plaintiff objected to information being withheld under exemptions 1 and 3 of

the Act because information fitting the defendant’s descriptions of the withheld information had already
been released in the public. This may not directly go to the third prong, but it nevertheless implicates
the same arguments that spurred this doctrine, i.e., information in the public domain. Id. at 1128–30.

86. Id. at 1132–33.
87.

Id. at 1130.

88. Id. at 1133–34.
89. Id. at 1134.
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court recognized that the argument that publicly known information may not be
withheld has garnered support from other courts.90 The court then cited cases
identifying the principle—at least in regard to FOIA requests—that the statute’s
central purpose would be thwarted if information remained classified after being
revealed to the public.91 Despite explicitly acknowledging the reasons to support
disclosure of the information at issue, the court rejected the plaintiff ’s argument
using a factually specific analysis to prohibit disclosure, and as a result, added
additional precedent for a narrow interpretation of the third element of the official
acknowledgment doctrine.92
Like the court’s holding in Hudson River Sloop, the narrow interpretation in
Afshar prevented disclosure of information that is similar to types of information that
has historically been leaked to the public by the government. The historical landscape
suggests that it is unnecessary and arbitrarily narrow to draw a stringent dividing
line between communications disseminated from what is an “official source” and
communications that come from an informal source. If government officials do not
abide by these distinctions when governing, then the judiciary cannot logically
employ such distinctions when interpreting and enforcing the governing law. As
Supreme Court Justice Stewart noted in New York Times Co. v. United States:
In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas
of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and
power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may lie in an
enlightened citizenry—in an informed and critical public opinion which
alone can here protect the values of democratic government.93

	In order to create and sustain an informed electorate, information must be
disclosed to the public. To achieve even this first step, the court cannot employ an
unduly narrow interpretation of the third element of the official acknowledgement
doctrine, and thus prohibit a wide spectrum of disclosures based on unfounded
categorical distinctions. The holding in Afshar, in connection with much of the
court’s sweeping statements about prohibiting disclosure when there are countervailing
national security concerns, establishes a foundation on which future opinions can
base even narrower interpretations of the official acknowledgment doctrine to prevent
disclosure.94
90. Id. at 1130.
91.

Id. (citing Lamont v. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The ‘sunshine’ purposes
of the FOIA would be thwarted if information remained classified after it became part of the public
domain.”)).

92.

Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1132–35.

93.

N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).

94. Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130–31. In looking at the documents that the plaintiff used for support, the court

stated:

[E]ven if a fact—such as the existence of such a liaison—is the subject of widespread
media and public speculation, its official acknowledgement by an authoritative source
might well be new information that could cause damage to the national security.
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Military Audit Project v. Casey, is yet another example of this unduly narrow
interpretation.95 Application of the narrow interpretation resulted in prohibiting
disclosure of information that was both widely available in the public domain, and
which was disclosed in authoritative and credible documents.96 In that case, the
plaintiff argued that the documents sought pursuant to a FOIA request should be
disclosed due to the government’s prior official disclosures concerning the information,
in addition to the widespread media attention of an event that included the
information sought.97 The government responded, asserting that despite the presence
of information in the public domain, the public may still not know certain truths
about its operations relating to this information, and thus disclosure could still pose
a serious threat to national security.98 The event and the media coverage to which the
plaintiff pointed concerned a Soviet submarine that was alleged to have been carrying
nuclear missiles, and which allegedly sank near Hawaii.99 Due to the fact that the
sunken submarine included nuclear missiles, codes and code machines, communication
gear and other equipment, American military and intelligence agencies had a
significant interest in recovering the information.100 To that end, the CIA and the
Navy constructed an elaborate cover story to retrieve the submarine, but somehow
the media discovered the truth of the expedition.101 When the CIA learned that the
media was aware of the events, the CIA tried to suppress the story and persuaded
major media outlets to “hold” the story.102 Time magazine, however, decided to
“break” the story, publishing the truth of the cover up and reporting on the
government’s attempt to prevent the story from being published.103 The plaintiff
contended that because the event was previously revealed by both official and
unofficial disclosures, the government should be prevented from withholding this

Id.

Unofficial leaks and public surmise can often be ignored by foreign governments that
might perceive themselves to be harmed by disclosure of their cooperation with the
CIA, but official acknowledgement may force a government to retaliate.

95. 656 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
96. Id.
97.

Id. at 728. The plaintiff sought access to documents concerning the Glomar Explorer Project, a project
allegedly undertaken by the CIA with the objective of raising a sunken Russian submarine that was on
the floor of the Pacific Ocean. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 729. The directors of the CIA and other CIA officials met with the New York Times, the Los

Angeles Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Star, major television networks, the National
Broadcasting System, Time, and Newsweek. All agreed to “hold” the story at least until another outlet
published the information. They agreed to this in exchange for briefings on the submarine raising
efforts. Id.

103. Id.
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information.104 The argument follows that, because all of this information was
disclosed, the government had nothing left to hide and should not be able to refuse
disclosing the information.105
	In addition to pointing to the pervasive media coverage, the plaintiffs—similarly
to the Afshar plaintiff—identified three official or semiofficial publications to buttress
their argument that the information was officially acknowledged.106 The specified
documents included the publication of a report by the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs, a National Science Foundation “Memorandum to Science
Writers and Editors,” and the French edition of a book written by former CIA
director William Colby.107 The court, however, relied on conclusory and legally
baseless reasoning, asserting that it could not assume that the CIA had nothing left
to hide, but rather that the record suggested that the CIA had something to hide or
that the CIA may want to hide the fact that it has nothing to hide.108 Based solely on
motion papers and affidavits, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment to the government, holding that the government had the right to
withhold the documents.109 This opinion is precedent to categorically exclude the
following documents from satisfying the third element of the official acknowledgment
doctrine: a senate committee report, a Time magazine article, a memorandum issued
by an accredited national foundation, and a book written by a former CIA director.
Such a narrow interpretation of “through an official and documented disclosure”
results in the implicit approval of blanket government censorship in the precise
situations where the official acknowledgment doctrine is intended to free information
from censorship.
B. The Narrow Interpretation Persists

	Recent case law provides further support for the proposition that courts are
construing “through an official and documented disclosure” too narrowly. Beyond
the immediate implications that these cases have in respect to preventing the
disclosure of information, each case provides additional judicial precedent against
the disclosure of information to which the public has a constitutional right to know.110
This creates the potential for censorship to become the starting point, rather than
the limited exception. Censorship cannot be the starting point in a democracy where
access to information and transparency are paramount.
104. Id. at 742.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 744–45.
109. Id. at 736.
110. See, e.g., Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 416 (2d Cir. 1989); see

generally U.S. Const. amend. I.
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	In Public Citizen v. Dep’t of State, the plaintiffs identified information reported in
congressional testimony to establish the government’s waiver of its right to prevent
disclosure under FOIA.111 Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that an ambassador
officially acknowledged content within classified documents during his public
congressional testimony by discussing many of the issues set forth in the documents.112
The court, however, was not persuaded by this argument, and reasoned that even
though much of the information in the documents was publicly acknowledged, the
context of the information was different.113 Furthermore, it found that even though
some of the information had been revealed, this fact did not negate the confidentiality
of the documents.114 In reaching this decision, the court explicitly recognized that
“in making this determination, the Court has deferred to the agency’s expertise on
issues of national security.”115 While this case is not directly on point because the
court does not explicitly base its decision to prohibit disclosure on the third element
of the official acknowledgement doctrine, the opinion is instructive because it
demonstrates how blanket deference, coupled with an increasingly narrow
interpretation, can result in the censorship of copious amounts of information.
Furthermore, it establishes precedent for rejecting congressional testimony as
sufficient evidence to satisfy “through an official and documented disclosure.”
The next example, Wilson v. McConnell, is a paradigm case demonstrating the
narrow interpretation and application of the third element of the official
acknowledgment doctrine.116 The information at issue was disclosed in the
Congressional Record, and concerned former CIA agent Valerie Wilson’s pre-2002
dates of employment for the CIA, which plaintiff Wilson sought to include in her
forthcoming memoir.117 Prior to resigning from her position at the CIA, Wilson
received a letter on February 10, 2006 (“the letter”) from the chief of the CIA’s
Retirement and Insurance Services in response to an inquiry regarding Wilson’s
retirement benefits.118 Included in this letter were plaintiff ’s purported dates of
employment with the agency.119 The letter was sent on CIA letterhead, by first class

111. Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of State, 782 F. Supp. 144, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
112. Id. at 145.
113. Id. at 145–46.
114. Id. at 146.
115. Id.
116. 501 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see Wolf. v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting

Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). Wilson was recently affirmed by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. Wilson v. CIA, No. 17-4244-CV (2d Cir. 2009).

117. Wilson, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 548–50.
118. Id. at 550.
119. Id. Prior to resigning from the CIA, plaintiff had requested that the CIA waive the minimum age

requirement so that she could receive her deferred annuity. The CIA sent this letter explaining that the
minimum age requirement could not be waived because it was statutory law. Id.
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mail, and without any indicia that the information contained was classified.120
Almost a year after receiving the letter, a materially identical version of the letter,
including plaintiff Wilson’s dates of employment, was admitted into the Congressional
Record.121 Furthermore, since the letter was admitted into the Congressional Record,
it has been available on the Internet through the Library of Congress’s website.122
Subsequent to the disclosure into the Congressional Record, plaintiff received another
letter from the chief of the CIA’s Retirement and Insurance Services, informing the
plaintiff that the information contained in the letter was classified, and that the absence
of a security stamp on the letter was the product of “administrative error.”123
The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction against the U.S. government and the
CIA, requesting that the government be prohibited from preventing Wilson from
publishing the information at issue, and other related information in her memoir.124
The government argued that the letter sent to the plaintiff was a result of administrative
error, and that the remarks in the Congressional Record were insufficient to waive the
CIA’s right and duty to protect national security information.125 The court accepted the
government’s position, holding that the information was not made public through an
official and documented disclosure because it was the plaintiff and/or the member of
congress who disclosed the information, not the CIA.126 In accordance with an unduly
narrow interpretation, the court reasoned that since the information was disseminated
in this manner, it could not bind the CIA.127 The court then imposed its typical
categorical distinctions to distinguish the information at issue so as to prohibit
disclosure. The court stated that there is a distinction between “official” and “unofficial”
disclosure, and that for information to be “official” it must be made public “through”
an official disclosure, and that the mere presence of information in the public domain
is not sufficient.128 It reasoned that the communication was sent to plaintiff in a private
letter not for public disclosure, and as such, her transmittal of the letter to Congress
was not official because to be official, the action needed to be authorized or approved
by a proper authority.129
120. Id. In fact, official CIA protocol forbids classified documents from being sent via first-class mail. Id.
121. Id. In light of Wilson’s inability to obtain her deferred annuity, House Representative Jay Inslee

introduced a private bill in Congress to make Wilson’s annuity available to her earlier than under the
existing statutory scheme. Wilson provided a copy of the letter to Representative Inslee, who introduced
a materially identical version of the letter into the Congressional Record. Id.

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Wilson, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 555.
125. Brief for the Government at 17–18, 21, Wilson v. McConnell, 501 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

(No. 1:07-CV-04595-BSJ), 2007 WL 5018036.

126. Wilson, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 558–59.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 556.
129. Id. at 558.
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Not only does this decision demonstrate the persistent application of an unduly
narrow interpretation of the third prong of the official acknowledgment doctrine,
the opinion also implicitly establishes that even statements made by congressional
representatives and published in the Congressional Record are not necessarily
“official.” This narrow interpretation, as exhibited in the numerous cases discussed
throughout this analysis, enables the government to put forth successful arguments
in favor of blanket censorship of any information that the government deems unfit
for disclosure. This is censorship for the sake of censorship, and creates a rationale
for explicitly withholding information where no legitimate rationale exists.
Azmy v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense is the most recent demonstration of the narrow
interpretation of the third element and its detrimental implications.130 In Azmy, the
plaintiff, a law professor, filed a FOIA request seeking information concerning his
client, Murat Kurnaz, who was a Turkish citizen and permanent resident of Germany.
Kurnaz was captured in Afghanistan and detained by the United States at the United
States naval base at Guantanamo Bay from 2002 to 2006.131 The request sought
disclosure of all records relating to all proceedings involving Kurnaz before the
Guantanamo Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) and the Guantanamo
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”), and any information otherwise related to the
reasons for Kurnaz’s capture, detention, or release.132 When the government rejected
plaintiffs FOIA request, plaintiff commenced litigation seeking to compel disclosure
of the requested materials.133 The plaintiff argued that disclosure was required because
much of the information at issue had been leaked to and discussed in the media, and
therefore there was no national security interest in withholding information that was
widely known to the public.134 The plaintiff advanced the quintessential policy
argument supporting disclosure pursuant to the official acknowledgement doctrine:
if the public is already apprised of information, the government should not be allowed
to withhold documents that merely confirm the veracity of the information requested.
Despite recognizing the effect of the official acknowledged doctrine in permitting
disclosure where the government has officially disclosed the information, the court
rejected plaintiff ’s argument that it was applicable to the information at issue.135
Once again, the court offered a conclusory analysis, simply stating that “[i]n this case,
subject to the exceptions discussed below, plaintiff is not requesting information that
has previously been made public through an official and documented disclosure.”136
130. Azmy v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 562 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
131. Id. at 596.
132. Id.
133. Id. In general, the government contended that the disputed information was withheld pursuant to

FOIA exemptions one, two, five, and/or seven. Id.

134. See id. at 598.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 599 (quoting Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). The court was aware of its

conclusory analysis, which is demonstrated in the opinion when the court states, “although it would be
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As a result, the court held that the information at issue was not made public through
an official and documented disclosure, and therefore it was properly withheld
pursuant to Exemption 1 of the FOIA statutes.137 Similar to the cases discussed
supra—Hudson River Sloop, Afshar, Military Audit Project, and Wilson—the unduly
narrow interpretation of the third prong of the official acknowledgement doctrine
prohibited disclosure of information warranting disclosure.
IV.	A Broader Interpretation Is Necessary And The Fair Report
Privilege Is An Appropriate Model

	Courts must refrain from employing a narrow interpretation and application of
the third prong of the official acknowledgement doctrine. Courts construe “official”
and “through” too narrowly, which is evidenced by case law that essentially equates
“official” with government documents released by individuals in the “appropriate”
position. This practice imposes an unduly stringent standard on the way in which
official information must be released to the public. The solution is a broader
interpretation and application of “through an official and documented disclosure”
whenever a plaintiff asserts the quintessential public domain argument.138 To
accomplish this objective, courts should look to a similar common law doctrine, the
fair report privilege, for guidance in discerning whether information is “official” and
how official information may be released into the public domain. This section asserts
that courts should interpret the third prong of the official acknowledgement doctrine
less narrowly, and that there is precedent on which courts can rely to reach this
interpretation. In addition, this section will assess case law that establishes the
definition of “official action and proceeding” in the context of the fair report privilege.
Analysis of fair report privilege case law is included as a model for how courts should
construe “through an official and documented disclosure” under the official
acknowledgement doctrine.
A. Precedent for a Broader Interpretation

	Case law analysis supports the argument that the third element of the official
acknowledgment doctrine is being interpreted and applied in an unduly narrow
manner. There is precedent for interpreting the third element less narrowly. In
Fitzgibbons v. CIA, the court implicitly established that information disclosed in a
congressional report constitutes a previous disclosure “through an official and
documented disclosure.”139 The plaintiff, a historian studying the disappearance of a
Basque exile and FBI informant who lived in New York City, filed a FOIA request
seeking government records from the CIA and the FBI in connection with the
inappropriate to provide more specifics in a public opinion, suffice it to say that the security implications
are evident on their face.” Azmy, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
137. Id.
138. See supra Part III.
139. See 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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disappearance.140 When the CIA withheld documents based on FOIA exemptions,
the plaintiff commenced litigation seeking disclosure of the withheld documents.141
The district court found that the information was officially acknowledged because it
was revealed in a 1975 congressional committee report, and therefore, the CIA
waived its right to exempt that information from disclosure under FOIA.142
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that disclosure of the information at issue was
warranted because the information was already in the public domain due to an official
disclosure, thus requiring disclosure pursuant to the official acknowledgment
doctrine.143 The court of appeals, however, reversed the district court ruling solely
because the information that the district court ordered the defendant to disclose
pertained to events earlier than those that the plaintiff argued were officially
acknowledged.144 Specifically, the court relied on Afshar v. Dep’t of State, concluding
that the “rationale of Afshar’s prohibition against extending any waiver of protection
to items concerning events later than the requested materials is equally applicable to
items concerning events earlier than the requested materials.”145
This reasoning results in the Fitzgibbons court implicitly establishing an exception
for information concerning events at the specific time in question. Importantly, the
Fitzgibbons court, in identifying the parameters of the official acknowledgment
doctrine, created a rule that if the specific information at issue exists within a
congressional report, it should be deemed officially acknowledged. Even though the
court did not find that the information satisfied the third element of the official
acknowledgment doctrine, this case demonstrates the ability by which a court may
construe the third element less narrowly, at least to include statements existing within
the congressional record, which has otherwise been rejected.146 While it may be
argued that this opinion is not sufficient to encompass all information worthy of
disclosure under the official acknowledgment doctrine, it is at least precedent for a
broader interpretation of the doctrine’s third element.
	Analysis of the Wilson opinion discussed supra, however, demonstrates how courts
are engaging in an unduly narrow interpretation, rather than construing the doctrine
less narrowly, as evidenced by Fitzgibbons. In fact, the Wilson court improperly
characterized precedent to reach its decision and disregarded a less-narrow
interpretation that was available. The Wilson court’s mischaracterization of precedent
is apparent in the court’s use of Wolf v. Central Intelligence Agency.147 In Wolf, the
140. See id. at 757.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 765–66.
143. See id. at 760.
144. Id. at 766.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Wilson v. McConnell, 501 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (rejecting that information

disclosed in the Congressional Record satisfies “through an official and documented disclosure”).

147. See id.; Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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appellant sought disclosure of CIA records pertaining to a former Colombian
politician.148 Plaintiff Wolf argued that the CIA had officially acknowledged the
records at issue in a 1948 congressional hearing.149 The CIA director delivered what
appeared to be a prepared statement, and also read from official CIA dispatches.150
The Wolf court held that the information included in his testimony was in fact “officially
acknowledged by the CIA.”151 The Wolf court recognized that congressional testimony
is an official acknowledgement, and when such information is disseminated in this
manner the government cannot otherwise prevent its disclosure. Wolf is therefore
another demonstration of a court construing “though an official and documented
disclosure” in a broader fashion to at least include congressional testimony.
The Wilson court, however, distinguished Wolf, resulting in a narrow interpretation
and application of the third element. The court reasoned that in Wolf the CIA
director testified directly before Congress, while in Wilson the CIA’s communication
was a private letter sent to plaintiff Wilson.152 While there is a distinction between
the letter being sent to plaintiff Wilson and the oral disclosures made in Wolf, the
Wilson court drew the wrong parallel. The relationship between Wolf and Wilson
does not stem from the communication between the plaintiff and the CIA. The
cases are analogous because in both cases information was “officially disclosed” in
the Congressional Record. Therefore, the information at issue in Wilson should have
also been held officially acknowledged, just as in Wolf and Fitzgibbons. Yet, the
imposition of a narrow interpretation and application of the third prong resulted in
the censorship of information that is legally eligible for disclosure.
	A policy rationale can be advanced to support the argument that there is a need to
withhold certain information by delineating between what is and is not deemed “officially
acknowledged.” This is because the third element of the official acknowledgement
doctrine is supported by the theory that when a disclosure is unofficial, the public is left
to surmise as to whether the disclosed information is accurate.153 This is argued to be
beneficial because in leaving the public to guess about what may be true, a degree of
protection and confidentiality is created around the subject matter, which may be lost
when information is officially disclosed or acknowledged by a governmental authority.154
This argument is increasingly persuasive in modern society, in which national security
interests are paramount and the dissemination of information occurs at a rapid and
unpredictable pace. Concededly, it is therefore important to preserve confidential
information in order to adequately protect national interests.
148. Wolf, 473 F.3d at 372.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 379.
151. Id. at 380.
152. Wilson, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 557.
153. O’Reilly, supra note 7.
154. Id.
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While it is arguably necessary to distinguish between official and unofficial
disclosures, the line need not be drawn as tightly as case law establishes. It is
conceivable for a court to create distinctions that adequately address national security
concerns while simultaneously recognizing the marked difference between that
which appears in an anonymous Internet blog, for example, and that which makes
the cover of the Washington Post, or even more so, that which is given credence by a
congressional committee. The way in which the official acknowledgement doctrine
is being applied and interpreted fails to account for the countervailing interest of an
informed citizenry. Furthermore, the narrow interpretation employed undermines
the very purpose of the official acknowledgement doctrine. The doctrine is supposed
to facilitate the disclosure of information, but the narrow approach causes the
doctrine to inhibit, rather than facilitate, disclosure. Courts must not equate the
phrase “through an official and documented” disclosure with “only information that
is stamped ‘disclosed’ by a government agency.” Interpretation of “official action and
proceeding” under a similar common law doctrine, the Fair Report Privilege, provides
an appropriate model of a broader interpretation.
B. The Fair Report Privilege Model

Under the fair report privilege, courts give broader meaning to what is “official”
when compared with how the term has been construed in the context of the official
acknowledgment doctrine. The fair report privilege provides protection to the press
when it publishes accounts of official proceedings or reports, even when the published
material contains defamatory statements.155 The fair report privilege is an appropriate
analytical framework to model in crafting a broader interpretation of the third
element of the official acknowledgment doctrine because both doctrines hinge on
the “official” nature of the information or situation at issue. Furthermore, there are
similar policy rationales that support both doctrines.
The fair report privilege provides that the publication of defamatory matter
concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding, or of a meeting
open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern, is privileged if the
report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported.156
In order to qualify for the privilege, the press has the burden of showing that the
report was (1) an accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of such proceeding, and
(2) not made solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.157
The comments and illustrations included in the Restatement give insight to the
meaning of the doctrine’s text. “Official proceedings” include any “report of any
official proceeding, or any action taken by any officer or agency of the government of

155. Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1981). The Fair Report Privilege is typically used as a

defense in defamation suits. Id. at 136.

156. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 (1977).
157. Medico, 643 F.2d at 138.
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the United States, or of any State or of any of its subdivisions.”158 This also includes
“the report of any official hearing or meeting, even though no other action is taken . . .
[and] any official proceeding or action of either the house of the Congress of the United
States or the legislative body of a State or the municipal council of a city, town or
village.”159 The comments are not clear as to whether the privilege applies to official
proceedings that are not public or available to the public under the law, but at least one
circuit court has extended the privilege to reach such proceedings.160
The fair report privilege should be looked to for guidance by analogy because it is
supported by similar policy rationales as the official acknowledgment doctrine. One
policy rationale is the agency theory, which provides that “one who reports what
happens in a public official proceeding acts as an agent for persons who had a right to
attend, and informs them of what they might have seen for themselves.”161 This theory
rests on the presumption that when a member of the public could have witnessed the
incident, he has a right to be informed of it.162 A second policy rationale is that of
public supervision. Justice Holmes provided insight into this concept, stating that:
[T]he privilege is justified by the security which publicity gives for the proper
administration of justice . . . it is desirable that the trial of causes should take
place under the public eye . . . because it is of the highest moment that those
who administer justice should always act under the sense of public
responsibility and that every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his
own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.163

These policies are closely aligned with the policies supporting increased disclosure
under the official acknowledgement doctrine because in many ways the official
acknowledgment doctrine serves as a check on the government. This was demonstrated
in the aforementioned cases pertaining to plaintiffs trying to use or obtain information
that conveyed information of public interest, but that was censored by the
government.164 This policy is rooted in the fact that elected officials obtain their
authority to govern from the public. Therefore, the public has an obligation to ensure
that the government is working effectively.165
158. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 cmt. d, illus. 2 (1977).
159. Id.
160. Medico, 643 F.2d 134 (extending to official proceedings that are not public or available to the public); see

also Wynn v. Smith, 16 P.3d 424 (2001) (not extending to confidential reports). The issue of whether
this privilege reaches confidential information is not relevant to the official acknowledgement doctrine
because the privilege does not need to extend to this area in order to apply the fair report privilege
meaning of “official action and proceeding” to the official acknowledgement doctrine to reach an
equitable result. See id. at 429.

161. Medico, 643 F.2d at 140–41.
162. Id. at 141.
163. Id.
164. See supra Part III.
165. See Medico, 643 F.2d at 141.
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Lastly, the third policy rationale of the Fair Report Privilege rests on the public’s
interest in learning of important matters.166 This rationale has been used to extend
this privilege to accounts of private, nongovernmental organizations dealing with
matters of legitimate public concern.167 This is also aligned with goals supporting the
official acknowledgment doctrine because the information at issue is most often of
legitimate public concern.168
	Conversely, it can be argued that the fair report privilege and the official
acknowledgment doctrine are distinct, which challenges the argument that courts
should construe the requirements similarly. Unlike the official acknowledgment
doctrine, the fair report privilege is relegated to those situations in which defamatory
statements were allegedly made, and the privilege may only be invoked by the media.169
These distinctions can be argued to support the proposition that it is acceptable to
employ a broader interpretation of “official action and proceeding” under the Fair
Report Privilege because it operates within limited situations and can only be used by
certain individuals, which is unlike the official acknowledgment doctrine, which, in
theory, may be advanced by any individual seeking disclosure of information.
While these are noteworthy distinctions, they do not surmount fundamental
principles of free speech jurisprudence, such as the marketplace of ideas and an informed
citizenry. The marketplace of ideas, as expressed by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
rests on the proposition that truth is most likely to surface from a clash of ideas.170
Justice Holmes stated that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”171 While the marketplace of ideas
typically relates to supporting free speech, it is also applicable to issues of government
disclosure. When the government withholds information that citizens have a right to
know, it is in effect filtering what information exists within the marketplace of ideas. If
the government withholds information from the marketplace, it is less likely that the
truth can rise to the surface. Moreover, the primary purposes for enacting FOIA were
to ensure an informed citizenry, to provide a needed check against government
corruption, and to hold those in power accountable to the governed.172 The official
acknowledgment doctrine, if given a broader interpretation, could accomplish these
same objectives. To interpret the doctrine in an unduly narrow fashion contravenes the
very purposes for which FOIA was enacted and, in essence, the very democratic ideals
on which the United States was founded.
166. Id. at 142.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 415 (2d Cir. 1989) (regarding

serious public concern about the risks of U.S. Navy warships with nuclear weapons being located in New
York City’s harbor); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (regarding a Soviet
submarine that was allegedly carrying nuclear missiles and which allegedly sank near Hawaii).

169. Medico, 643 F.2d at 138.
170. Chemerinsky, supra note 10, at 927.
171. Id. (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
172. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
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C. Fair Report Privilege Case Law

The following cases demonstrate how the phrase “official action and proceeding”
is interpreted under the fair report privilege and suggest an appropriate analytical
framework that courts can apply to broaden the official acknowledgement doctrine.
	In Medico v. Time, the Third Circuit assessed whether FBI documents that were
confidential and not authorized to be released fell within the privilege.173 Time
magazine had published an article describing suspected criminal activities of a
congressman and linking the congressman to an organized crime family operating
under the name of Medico Industries.174 Medico instituted a defamation action against
Time, to which Time asserted the fair report privilege as a defense.175 To support its
argument, Time submitted an affidavit from a former FBI official, two FBI documents,
and a FBI personal profile on Philip Medico.176 The court held that these documents
were an “official proceeding” under the privilege, reasoning by analogy to the
Pennsylvania case, Hanish v. Westinghouse Broadcasting, in which the court held that the
privilege applied to a news report summarizing a civil complaint.177 The court found
that the FBI files were at least as “official” as the pleadings in the civil cases because
the FBI documents were created by government agents acting in their official
capacities.178 The court also looked to a supporting policy rationale in reaching its
decision.179 It found that the content of the Time magazine article was of legitimate
public interest, which should limit press liability for its publication.180 Furthermore, the
court specifically noted that due to the difficulty in obtaining documents that would
corroborate the FBI information, the press is often going to have to rely on materials
created by the government in order to report on matters of public concern.181
The notion of difficulty in obtaining sources to corroborate a story provides
further support to apply the broader interpretation of “official action and proceeding”
to the official acknowledgment doctrine. One of the primary reasons that plaintiffs
assert the official acknowledgment doctrine is because it is difficult to obtain certain
information. For example, in the FOIA context, the plaintiffs are specifically seeking
information that they cannot obtain elsewhere, but that for various reasons—
including legitimate public concern—the plaintiffs argue should be disclosed.
Medico also supports the argument that information made public through nontraditional disclosures, such as leaks to the media, may be characterized as “official”
173. Medico, 643 F.2d at 136.
174. Id. at 135.
175. See id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 140.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 140–43.
180. Id. at 142.
181. Id.
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for the purposes of protection under the privilege. The court specifically stated that
“how Time magazine obtained its knowledge of the FBI materials is irrelevant . . . .
[t]he article is privileged as a fair and accurate summary of the FBI materials.”182
This reasoning displays how courts can move away from using a stringent analysis
for determining how information is obtained and released, and instead focus on the
information at issue.
	Case law interpreting the fair report privilege extends to official interviews with
police chiefs, government press releases, official conversations, district attorney press
conferences, information obtained through an official government channel, legislative
documents, and information provided by law enforcement authorities.183 The
extension to legislative documents and information provided by law enforcement
authorities is particularly relevant because it is in these areas where courts, when
interpreting the “through an official and documented disclosure” prong of the official
acknowledgement doctrine, have found disclosures under these circumstances to be
not “official.”184 In Cresson v. Louisville Courier-Journal, the court held the fair report
privilege to apply to information included within a congressional report. And in
Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., the court also found the Fair Report Privilege
to apply to information supplied from the Philadelphia Police Department and the
FBI.185 In Mathis, it is noteworthy that the court accredited protection to the press
even though the information was obtained in an informal report concerning an
ongoing investigation, as well as from oral testimony reported to the press.186
	In addition, in the recent case Hudak v. Times Publishing Co., the court found that
judicial proceedings, and reporting on the on-going nature of the proceedings
concerning a plaintiff ’s criminal charges, fell within the ambit of the privilege.187 More
importantly, the court found that statements made by the district attorney to news
reporters were a “report” or “official action” to be protected under the privilege.188 The
court explained the scope of the privilege, recognizing that even though the privilege
has been interpreted to reach a multitude of situations, it is not absolute. The privilege
may in fact be overcome if the party opposing the privilege can establish that the press
“overtly embellished or made exaggerated additions to an account of a proceeding.”189
182. Id. at 147.
183. See Alsop v. Cincinnati Post, 24 Fed. Appx. 296, 297 (6th Cir. 2001); Cresson v. Louisville Courier-

Journal, 299 F. 487, 488 (6th Cir. 1924); Hudak v. Times Publ’g Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 546, 572–73
(W.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 2003)); Mathis v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, 455 F. Supp. 407, 415 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Thomas v. Tel. Publ’g Co., 155 N.H. 314, 327
(2007); Wright v. Grove Sun Newspaper Co., 873 P.2d 983, 988 (Okla. 1994); Tilles v. Pulitzer Publ’g
Co., 145 S.W. 1143, 1152 (Mo. 1912).

184. See supra Part III.
185. See Cresson, 299 F. at 491; Mathis, 455 F. Supp. at 416–17.
186. Mathis, 455 F. Supp. at 416–17.
187. Hudak, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 560–62.
188. Id. at 572.
189. Id. at 559.
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The official acknowledgment doctrine embodies a similar limitation, which is
evidenced by the elements of the doctrine that require the information to be (1) as
specific as the information previously released and that (2) it must match the
information previously disclosed.190 Like in the fair report privilege, these
requirements ensure that the doctrine is not abused and that it only extends to that
specific information that warrants disclosure. If courts do not construe the third
element of the official acknowledgment doctrine narrowly, and instead interpret it
similarly to how courts assess “official action and proceeding” under the fair report
privilege, information that is available in the public domain and deserving of
disclosure will be officially acknowledged by courts and disclosed to the public.
V. CONCLUSION

	Courts and the media are similar in at least one respect—they have the ability to
be a check on government power. The judiciary serves this function through the
formal structure of checks and balances, and the media serves this function through
investigative reporting. Each entity must perform these functions to assist in
maintaining a democratic government. The official acknowledgment doctrine
provides a way by which the judiciary can do this because it is aimed at facilitating
disclosure. However, courts must utilize a broader approach when interpreting and
applying the third element of this doctrine.
	Current case law interpreting “official action and proceeding” under the fair
report privilege provides the appropriate analytical framework that courts should
apply to avoid sustaining an unduly narrow interpretation of “through an official and
documented disclosure” under the official acknowledgement doctrine. If the fair
report privilege’s analytical framework were applied to the official acknowledgment
doctrine, the unduly narrow interpretation of “through an official and documented
disclosure” would be replaced with a broader interpretation that appropriately reflects
the purpose and policy supporting the official acknowledgment doctrine.
Furthermore, application of this broader interpretation would free a large volume
of information previously censored under the current interpretation. Such information
includes legislative documents, such as congressional testimony and Senate committee
reports, affidavits from government agents irrespective of their employment status,
news stories and media reports corroborated by public court documents, and oral and
written statements from government actors who are in a position to speak
authoritatively about the information at issue. Disclosure of such information will
enable the citizenry to be equipped with the information often necessary to maintain
democratic institutions. The lines between “official” and “unofficial” should not act
as a barrier to disclosing information about government—the objective to create an
informed citizenry is too important.

190. Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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